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It is generally agreed that Adam Smith invoked the Invisible Hand  
to send the message to posterity that a free-market economy is the 
best form of economic organization. Strictly speaking, the Invisible  
Hand of Adam Smith is a conjecture about the virtues of a free-market 
economy. There are three claims in this paper concerning the  
interpretation of the Invisible Hand conjecture. First, the neoclassical 
interpretation engenders a conceptual confusion –identified here as  
the ‘double paradox’ of the Invisible Hand. Second, the interpretation  
of Adam Smith’s conjecture on the beneficial effects of the free-market 
economy cannot –and should not– be confined to the production and 
consumption of existing products. Failure to distinguish the Invisible  
Hand Theorem from the Invisible Hand Doctrine distorts thinking  
about Adam Smith’s message, creating the misconception that the  
Invisible Hand passage excludes business innovation. Third, the  
central message conveyed by Invisible Hand is to be read in the  
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1. Introduction  
One of the striking characteristics of the modern economy is the rapid creation adoption, and 
diffusion of innovation. Not surprisingly, the economics of innovation has grown immensely. 
What is surprising, however, is that business innovation is everywhere, except in current 
textbooks of undergraduate economics. There are at least two major reasons for this bizarre 
situation. First, neoclassical economics was the predominant style of doing economics in the 
20
th
 century, and second, the neoclassical approach confined attention to efficiency but left 
the most important part of economic evolution, namely innovation, unexplained. Nelson 
(2002). 
Schumpeter (1947) threw a wrench into theoretical economics by pointing out that, if you 
take your model seriously, innovation cannot be easily ruled out. Consider the world of 
reality (say, an economy or a sector of an economy) operating with an ‘existing practice’ and 
given data (for example, the state of technology, tastes, governmental and institutional 
framework, etc.). The real world can be thought of as a system with interconnected parts. 
Generally speaking, if one or more data change, the system will react. Schumpeter (1947) 
made the following simple, yet fundamental point: in general, the response of the system to 
the change in data can be analytically bifurcated into a response within the existing practice 
(adaptive response) and a response outside the range of the existing practice (creative 
response).  
The preceding insight gives rise to what may be called the Schumpeter’s critique of 
economics: economic theorists tend to concentrate their intellectual effort on the adaptive 
response and assume away the creative response.
i
 Antonelli (2011) has argued that the 
standard answers to the Schumpeter’s critique leave a lot to be desired, and proposed a 
framework –in which complexity enters the picture in a fundamental way– to capture the 
creative response. As will become apparent in the present paper, the Schumpeter’s critique 
finds an important application in the neoclassical interpretation of Adam Smith. 
Progress in economics is cumulative and based on the great economic thinkers of past times, 
as well as the lesser scholars and practitioners. Previous economic knowledge accumulates 
and feeds into the generation of modified and new conceptual frameworks. Sometimes 
knowledge is made obsolete by the emergence of newer, superior frameworks of analysis. At 
other times paradoxical arguments are clarified to reconcile seemingly contradictory facts or 
to make counterintuitive propositions understandable. Examples of economic paradoxes 
abound: the paradox of value (e.g. diamonds and water), the Giffen paradox in demand 
theory, the Leontieff paradox in international trade, the paradox of thrift, and the paradox of 
voting are a few. 
The first systematic attempt to found an economic science was made in France around the 
middle of the 18
th
 century by the Physiocrats. Adam Smith (1723-1790) resided several years 
in France and interacted with the Physiocrats. (Marshall 1966, 626). In that epoch, new 
technologies were being created and applied to the manufacture of products such as cotton, 
wool and iron, in what came to be called the First Industrial Revolution. Adam Smith was 
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keenly interested in technological innovation because he wanted to understand the sources of 
the wealth of nations.  
However, Smith undertook the colossal task of founding the economic science by focusing on 
existing products, and thereby, left the issue of introducing new products into the market 
untouched. Quite obviously, the fact that business innovation was left out of the picture does 
not imply that technological innovation was irrelevant to him. It was left to Schumpeter’s 
acute powers of observation and abstraction to go inside the black box of technological 
creativity and pull out business innovation as the most important factor underlying economic 
change. Economic growth cannot be understood solely in terms of the accumulation of capital 
and the expansion of the labour force. 
Adam Smith will be “the most famous of all economists” forever and his insights will always 
be recognized as enduring stepping stones for scientific progress. Overall, Smith’s theoretical 
conceptions focus on the free-market economy and the forces determining economic growth. 
His belief that a free-market economy is of absolutely fundamental importance for attaining 
economic prosperity was not primarily based on its allocative efficiency but on its growth 
inducing effects. (Landreth and Colander 2002, 104).  
Beyond any doubt the Smithian vision of the market mechanism has had a profound impact 
on the economic science in particular, and posterity in general. Some of his influential ideas 
have been used as teaching and learning tools ever since the publication of the Wealth of 
Nations in 1776. Smith’s immortal metaphor to describe the power of the free-market 
mechanism as a guiding ‘invisible hand’ conducive to economic prosperity can be found in 
nearly all the contemporary introductory economics textbooks. For example, the Invisible 
Hand is a recurrent topic in the sixteenth edition of Samuelson’s Economics –the textbook 
first published in 1948 that established a new pattern for all the late 20
th
 textbooks.  
It is generally agreed that Adam Smith invoked the Invisible Hand –an expression that occurs 
only once in the Wealth of Nations– to send the message to posterity that a free-market 
economy is the best form of economic organization. Smith did not formally prove anything in 
relation to the Invisible Hand of the free-market mechanism. Strictly speaking, the Invisible 
Hand of Adam Smith is a conjecture about the virtues of a free-market economy. 
Smith also used the phrase ‘invisible hand’ only once in his Theory of Moral Sentiments in a 
somewhat different context (Smith 1981, 264) and only once in his History of Astronomy as 
the ‘invisible hand of Jupiter,’ where Jupiter represents the ignorant savage’s view of the 
divine order. (Smith 1980, 49). 
Two important points about the History of Astronomy are worth noting. First, Smith (1980) 
surmised that the scientific activity consists of formulating ‘connecting principles’ (somewhat 
roughly, creating analytical categories and establishing links between them), as Loasby 
(2002) explains with care, insight, and lucidity. Second, Smith wrote the History of 
Astronomy before 1758. Unfortunately, we do not know how long before 1758 the History of 
Astronomy was written. What matters, however, is that with all probability the History of 
Astronomy shaped the writing of the Wealth of Nations.  
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The formidable task of formalizing the meaning of the Invisible Hand conjecture was 
undertaken by Kenneth Arrow, Gerard Debreu and many other economic theorists who 
interpreted the Invisible Hand conjecture as signalling economic efficiency. Specifically, 
Arrow and Debreu (1954) proved mathematically that under certain (idealized) conditions a 
free-market economy is efficient. That is, the allocation of products achieved at the 
equilibrium prices originated by the free market is efficient. 
To write a paper on Adam Smith’s Invisible Hand more than two hundred years after the 
publication of the Wealth of Nations is intellectually risky. For example, some readers might 
ask: Why do we need to revisit the interpretation of the Invisible Hand after the publication of 
Hahn’s (1982) paper “Reflections on the Invisible Hand” or Persky’s (1989) paper “Adam 
Smith’s Invisible Hands”?  
There are three claims in this paper concerning the interpretation of the Invisible Hand 
conjecture. First, the neoclassical interpretation engenders a conceptual confusion –identified 
here as the ‘double paradox’ of the Invisible Hand. Second, the interpretation of Adam 
Smith’s conjecture on the beneficial effects of the free-market economy cannot –and should 
not– be confined to the production and consumption of existing products. While the 
paradoxes are resolved taking the notion of a free-market economy out of the straight-jacket 
imposed by the general equilibrium model, the content of the second claim lies in the 
separation between the Invisible Hand Theorem from the Invisible Hand Doctrine. Failure to 
distinguish between these two quite distinct interpretations of the Invisible Hand metaphor 
distorts thinking about Adam Smith’s message, creating the misconception that the Invisible 
Hand passage excludes business innovation. Third, the central message conveyed by Invisible 
Hand is to be read in the context of modern evolutionary economics. To defend this claim, we 
take advantage of evolutionary economics synthesis articulated by Loasby (2002). 
In order to develop the argument of this paper we have had recourse to several quotations 
from the original texts, preferring that the authors we discuss should speak in their own words 
rather than running the risk of misrepresenting them by paraphrase. The next section 
succinctly summarizes the neoclassical interpretation of the Invisible Hand conjecture and 
introduces the notion of a purely deductive economic model. Section 3 brings into sharp 
focus the two paradoxes emerging from the neoclassical interpretation. Section 4 resolves the 
double paradox. Section 5 outlines the Invisible Hand Doctrine and makes contact with 
evolutionary economics. In the (concluding) Section 6 we summarize the thread of the 
argument articulated in this paper to attain an acceptable interpretation of the Invisible Hand 
conjecture. 
2. Neoclassical Interpretation  
Few economists would disagree with the following interpretation of the Invisible Hand 
conjecture: 
Two centuries ago, Adam Smith proclaimed that, through the  
workings of the invisible hand, those who pursue their own  
self-interest in a competitive economy would most effectively  
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promote the public interest. This concept –that the rough-and 
-tumble of market competition– is a potent force for raising  
output and living standards– is one of the most profound and  
powerful ideas in history. 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, 265)  
Clearly, the way Samuelson and Nordhaus paraphrase Smith can accommodate the two basic 
functions of markets: allocative and creative.  
2.1. The invisible hand theorem 
The formal interpretation of the Invisible Hand conjecture is based on the general equilibrium 
model. Strictly speaking, as Debreu says, the general equilibrium model is “logically entirely 
disconnected from its interpretation.” (Debreu, 1959, p. x). The neoclassical interpretation of 
the Invisible Hand was labelled the “invisible hand theorem” by Paul A. Samuelson.
ii
 In 
essence, the theorem states that a free-market economy implies economic efficiency.  
The intuition behind the axiomatic proof this theorem is that the free interaction of utility-
maximizing buyers and profit-maximizing sellers ends up producing efficiency. In particular, 
this happens because the price mechanism induces private firms to allocate the ‘right’ amount 
of resources in each activity, and that allocation will be an efficient allocation of resources. 
The prices and profits of the existing products are signals that determine where the resources 
will flow. Earnings (positive profits) emerging from a particular sector attract resources into 
that sector, and losses (negative profits) induce resources to move elsewhere. Furthermore, 
the realization of normal profits (that is, the minimum remuneration for the firm to remain in 
the market) is the criterion according to which successful firms are selected. 
In the neoclassical interpretation of the Invisible Hand conjecture, the meaning of both ‘free-
market economy’ and ‘efficiency’ is precise. A free-market economy is a perfectly 
competitive economy with no government intervention. An economy satisfying this 
definition does not and cannot exist and presumably never existed. This definition – which 
constitutes the traditional textbook concept of a free-market economy – will be referred to as 
the strong definition of a free-market economy because of the stringent conditions involved 
in its formulation. 
As it is well-known, the defining characteristics of perfect competition consist of four 
conditions: (1) both firms and consumers are numerous (strictly speaking, there exists an 
infinite number of economic agents); (2) firms produce homogeneous products (the product 
of a firm is indistinguishable from the products of others) and consumers are identical from 
the seller’s viewpoint; (3) there is perfect information on both sides of the market; and (4) 
entry into and exit from the market is free for firms and consumers. In particular, resources 
always move into sectors from which they derive the greatest advantage. 
As to ‘efficiency,’ the Invisible Hand Theorem refers to ‘Pareto optima.’ Specifically, the 
theorem states that a free-market economy is Pareto efficient. In turn, a Pareto-efficient 
allocation of resources is a situation in which no feasible reallocation of resources in the 
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economy could increase the level of utility of one or more buyers without lowering the level 
of utility of any other buyer.  
2.2. Purely deductive economic models 
To bring into sharp focus the bizarre consequences of the neoclassical conception of the 
Invisible Hand conjecture, we pause for a moment to introduce a dichotomy of economic 
models. Economic models are necessary. They are merely simplified frameworks, and there 
is no inherent reason why they must be mathematical. Formal logic and mathematical 
consistency come into their own in checking the consistency and completeness of the models 
and exploring their implications. We will find it useful to distinguish ‘scientific’ economic 
models from ‘purely deductive’ economic models.  
The essential distinguishing features of scientific economic models are two: first, the 
propositions are logically consistent with each other, and second, there must be at least one 
statement derived from the assumptions which could conceivably be refuted by the empirical 
evidence. In brief, a scientific economic model is one capable of producing empirically 
falsifiable statements.  
In contrast, a purely deductive economic model is a consistent mathematical model –
originally suggested by an economic problem – which cannot be refuted by empirical data. 
What kind of evidence could contradict this model? No hypothetically conceivable 
experiment could ever controvert a purely deductive model. These models do not have 
empirical content. Note that this characterization remains silent about the realism of the 
assumptions. The assumptions or axioms of a purely deductive economic model can be 
factually true or factually false. For this kind of economic models what matters is logical 
completeness and consistency, not the realism of the assumptions.  
Purely deductive economic models are not new. More than sixty years ago Paul A. 
Samuelson identified the conceptual framework of welfare economics as an empirically 
empty construct: 
(...) It is only fair to point out, however, that the theorems  
enunciated under the heading of welfare economics are not  
meaningful propositions or hypotheses in the technical sense.  
For they represent the deductive implications of assumptions  
which are not themselves meaningful refutable hypotheses  
about reality. 
(Samuelson 1965, 221) 
2.3. A Supreme and Extreme Example 
Existence of equilibrium entails the logical possibility of pre-reconcilable choices. 
(Weintraub 1979, 29). The proof of the existence of general equilibrium in the fifties was 
considered a major intellectual achievement. It was shown not only that a perfectly 
competitive equilibrium exists but also that every free-market equilibrium is Pareto-efficient 
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and that Pareto-efficient allocations can be realized by a price system such that the allocation 
is also a free-market equilibrium. (Weintraub 1983, 28). 
However, the general equilibrium model is a supreme example of a purely deductive 
economic model. In fact, Kirman (1989) has shown that this model is empirically empty in 
that it is unable to produce empirically falsifiable propositions. But there is a further serious 
difficulty. The general equilibrium model is also an extreme example because the necessary 
assumptions for the existence of equilibrium are patently false (that is, directly contrary to the 
real economic world, not just ‘abstract’). For example, the assumption of perfect competition 
is directly contradicted by observation. Kaldor (1972). 
Purely deductive economic models tend to display mathematical beauty. For example, the 
proof of existence of general equilibrium is obtained using the elegant machinery of topology 
with particular regard to fixed point theorems. “One must be far gone in philistine turpitude 
not to appreciate the quite surprising nature of this result [existence of general equilibrium], 
or to be unmoved by the elegant means by which it is proved.” (Hahn 1982, 4).  
To be sure, purely deductive economic models are of value to organize thinking about real 
world issues. A case in point is the conventional notion of ‘market failure.’ This concept is 
inextricably linked to the lack of economic efficiency. Market failure refers to breaches of the 
multitude of conditions necessary to squeeze efficiency out of the free-market economy. 
Generally speaking, externalities, market power, and imperfect information are efficiency-




3. The Double Paradox 
Adam Smith’s simile comparing the workings of a free-market economy to an Invisible Hand 
continues to convey a profound message.  However, the identification of the Invisible Hand 
conjecture with Pareto efficiency is not free of difficulties. As will become apparent the 
Invisible Hand Theorem engenders a double paradox. 
3.1.First paradox: losing the Smithian vision 
It is pertinent to reiterate that the conditions necessary to squeeze efficiency out of general 
equilibrium are factually false. The Samuelson-Nordhaus evaluation of the practical use of 
this Invisible Hand Theorem is devastatingly unambiguous: 
But the invisible-hand result [Invisible Hand Theorem] holds  
only under very limited conditions. All goods must be  
produced efficiently by perfectly competitive firms. All goods  
must be private goods like loaves of bread, the total of which  
can be cut up into separate slices of consumption for different  
individuals, so that  the more I consume out of the total, the  
less you consume. There can be no externalities like air  
pollution. Consumers and firms must be fully informed about  
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the prices and characteristics of the goods they buy and sell.  
If all these idealized conditions were met, the invisible hand  
could provide perfectly efficient production and distribution  
of national output, and there would be no need for government  
intervention to promote efficiency. 
(...) In reality, each and every one of the idealized conditions  
enumerated above is violated to some extent in all human  
societies. (...) 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, 285) 
This evaluation is bewildering because it suggests that the notion of a free-market economy is 
a kind of fantasy whose key elements contradict reality. Is the Invisible Hand conjecture a 
deep insight or a curiosum? 
Needless to say, we encounter an awkward situation. If we identify the Invisible Hand of the 
marketplace with unseen forces operating in a free-market economy and recognize the 
pervasiveness of market failure, it follows at once that the free-market mechanism is 
incapable of attaining efficiency. Or, to put it differently, the Invisible Hand cannot work its 
magic in the real world. The Invisible Hand Theorem makes the Invisible Hand conjecture a 
curiosum. 
Typically, an economist would immediately assert: to show that the free-market economy is 
subject to market failure is not the same as showing that government intervention will do 
better than actual free markets (which is correct). But this is not the point. The issue is that 
we praise the Smithian vision because it works exceedingly well in the real world, but the 
formalization of the insight leaves us naked in a cold winter. When we look at the real 
economy through the lens of the general equilibrium model, the Smithian vision of the 
Invisible Hand is lost. (Hahn 1982, 6).  
To put it bluntly, it is impossible for a free-market economy to attain efficiency because the 
conditions imposed by the strong definition of the free-market economy are not satisfied by 
any real economy. If we accept that the pursuit of the impossible is irrational, trying to 
organize an economy according to the tenets of a free-market economy is irrational. What 
would Adam Smith’s reaction be to this implication? Smith would have recoiled in horror 
from such conclusion. 
No one would object that knowing the Invisible Hand Theorem is important. What is 
objectionable is the use of the theorem to interpret the message conveyed by the Invisible 
Hand conjecture. The claim that the Invisible Hand Theorem is the interpretation of the 
conjecture is unreasonable because it engenders a double paradox. 
The first paradox of the Invisible Hand is fairly obvious: the free-market mechanism is of 
absolutely fundamental importance for the organization of the economy but when we 
translate the insight into the language of general equilibrium we find that no real economy 
satisfies the necessary conditions to squeeze efficiency out of the free-market economy. 
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This paradox has a perplexing impact on economics students. We teach our students that the 
Invisible Hand Theorem is comparable to the Newtonian law of gravity, but then, we 
immediately comment that there is no real economy that satisfies the idealized conditions 
necessary for the Invisible Hand to work its magic. It is like designing a pollution-free power 
plant and proving that the facility can only function with minerals that do not exist on this 
planet. 
3.2. Recovering the vision: the Samuelson-Nordhaus advice 
Attempts to recover the theoretical relevance Invisible Hand started in the mid-fifties. 
Unfortunately, the theory of second best showed that attempts to solve the paradox (that is, 
the first best optimum conditions simply cannot be satisfied in the real world) are in the 
nature of taking a shortcut through quicksand. The typical result is a formidably complex 
collection of decision rules in place of the simple “price = marginal cost” conditions 
customary in the first best problems. The main result reached by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) 
is that when the first best conditions cannot be attained, it is no longer desirable to fulfil the 
other first best conditions. 
Faced with this disconcerting fact, we can resort to the Samuelson-Nordhaus’s analogy of the 
frictionless vacuum of the physicist and believe that the distortions of the real world will 
disappear in the long-run: 
The perfectly competitive world of the economist is like the  
frictionless vacuum of the physicist. Even though engineers  
know that they can never create a perfect vacuum, they still  
find the analysis of behaviour in a vacuum extremely valuable  
for illuminating many complex problems. So it is with our  
competitive model. In the long run, many imperfections  
turn out transient as monopolies are eroded by competing  
technologies. While oversimplified, the [perfectly] competitive  
model points to many important hypotheses about economic  
behaviour, and these hypotheses appear especially valid in the  
long run. 
(Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998, 275, italics added) 
 
In essence, the Samuelson-Nordhaus advice consists of following Joan Robinson’s dictum 
that one must be patient and optimistic with simplifications. In the long-run, the economy 
will converge to the perfectly competitive model. 
3.3. Second paradox: suppressing business innovation 
Practical people, including most economists, understand that the Samuelson-Nordhaus’s 
optimism about the long run may not be warranted. But even if we accept that the Invisible 
Hand Theorem can be used to gain an understanding of the beneficial effects of the free-
market mechanism in the long run, we encounter a daunting obstacle: the neoclassical 
interpretation of the conjecture suppresses the creative function of the free-market. 
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The line of argument that gives rise to the second paradox is direct. The perfectly competitive 
model refers to existing products in a fundamental way. The requirement of a constant set of 
products and processes of production (or production functions) is inextricably linked to the 
notion of perfect competition. Furthermore, the first two defining characteristics of a 
perfectly competitive economy –conditions (1) and (2)– ensure that no economic agent has 
market power. It follows at once that business innovation is logically impossible under 
perfect competition because innovation always entails market power.
iv
 
Business innovation is an economic activity. Prospective profits and the pursuit of market 
power are powerful forces conducive to the creation of new products or processes or new 
forms of organization. It should be clear that the study of innovation as an economic activity 
requires both the abandonment of perfect competition and the acceptance that the existence of 
technological externalities is the rule rather than the exception. It should also be clear that the 
purely deductive model employed to formalize the Invisible Hand conjecture leads to a 
counterintuitive conclusion: innovation provokes market failure. 
In a nutshell, the second paradox of the Invisible Hand emerging from the general 
equilibrium treatment of the conjecture can be formulated as follows: innovation is an 
economic activity of absolutely fundamental importance in the modern economy, but this 
economic activity is not open to the influence of the Invisible Hand.  
4. Resolving the Double Paradox 
Where does this leave us with respect to the role of the Invisible Hand? In a somewhat 
muddled state, but being muddled is not unusual for economics.  At this point, it seems 
reasonable to read again Adam Smith’s justly famous paragraph: 
Every individual necessarily labours to render the annual revenue  
of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed, neither  
intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he  
is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of  
foreign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing  
the industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest  
value; he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many  
other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was  
no part of it. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was  
not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes  
that of the society more effectively than when he really intends to  
promote it.  
(Smith 1776, 423, italics added) 
 
Smith proffered that the free-market mechanism acted like a guiding Invisible Hand. It is 
clear that prices and profits are the unseen forces guiding economic behaviour. People act 
economically when an opportunity for gain is presented to them and they take it. Or, to put it 
differently, economic agents are motivated by self-interest and the Invisible Hand of the 
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marketplace guides these profit-seeking creatures into promoting economic prosperity. It 
should also be clear that the ‘individual’ involved is not necessarily a producer. The Invisible 
Hand paragraph does not preclude profit-seeking innovators in any imaginable way.  
 
4.1.Abandonment of the neoclassical approach 
The double paradox of the Invisible Hand can be resolved in two steps: first, showing that the 
existing neoclassical interpretation of the conjecture must be rejected on both methodological 
and conceptual grounds, and second, taking the notion of free-market economy out of the 
straight-jacket imposed by the general equilibrium model. 
The compelling methodological tenet –obvious, but often forgotten– is that a purely 
deductive economic model whose necessary assumptions are incompatible (in a fundamental 
way) with any actually existing economy cannot decide the empirical relevance of an 
economic insight that refers to the real economy. The formal proofs of the existence and 
efficiency of general equilibrium do not prove or disprove the Invisible Hand conjecture.  
Having seen that the use of purely deductive economic models lacks rigorous defence to 
validate economic insights, it is important to note that the problematic factor in the 
interpretation of the conjecture is not the mathematics involved in the proof of the proposition 
‘free-market economy implies efficiency.’ The strong definition of a free-market economy is 
responsible for the paradoxes because a free-market economy is a perfect-market economy. 
In particular, the defining characteristics of this ideal type of economy (no time, no strategic 
behaviour, no patents, no trademarks, etc.) automatically imply an economy where no 
innovative activity can take place. Consequently, a free-market economy is a stick-in-the mud 
economy, one populated by economic agents lacking initiative, opposed to new ideas, 
progress, and novelty. 
One inevitable conclusion follows. If we do not want to ‘lose’ the powerful message of the 
Invisible Hand, we have to relax the notion of a free-market economy. The general 
equilibrium notion of ‘free-market economy’ has to be abandoned in order to capture a salient 
feature of most modern economies, namely incessant business innovation.  
4.2.Weak definition of a free-market economy 
An economy is a collection of interrelated economic activities revolving around the allocation 
of resources to producing both existing products and new products emerging from business 
innovation. The consumption of the economy is regarded as the end of economic activity. 
This is the loosest possible description of the notion of an economy.  
Generally speaking, a real economy displays two additional characteristics. The economy (a) 
operates in the context of a legal system which includes well-defined property rights and 
constraints on what products economic agents are entitled to produce and sell; and (b) allows 
cooperation between the private sector and the government.  
Preferring to err on the side of defining the free-market economy too broadly, we adopt the 
following weak definition: a free-market economy is one based on two structural pillars, 
12 
 
private property of capital and what Marshall (1966) called the System of Economic 
Freedom.
v
 In practice, economic freedom has to reach a balance between strong economic 
competition and government interference with the economy. For example, patent and 
copyright laws imply government interference because they temporarily reduce economic 
competition based on price. 
The weak definition is consistent with the Smithian vision of a free-market economy. Lord 
Lionel Robbins documented effectively Smith’s externality argument for government 
intervention (Robbins 1978, 31) as well as the extensive role that Smith assigned to the state 
in the economy (Robbins 1978, 37). 
In a free-market economy the signals guiding resource allocation are the prices of existing 
products and the prospective profits associated with new ideas with economic value. Any 
organization systematically unable to make normal profits (be it a profit-seeking company, a 
cooperative, a social enterprise, etc.) either leaves the market or has to be financially 
supported by other participants in the economy (for example, by the government).  
5. Invisible Hand Doctrine and Evolutionary Economics 
It sometimes seems that general equilibrium theorists invoked the name of Adam Smith in 
order to endow their models with an impressive intellectual origin. Many economists know in 
their hearts that the connection of general equilibrium with the spirit and even the letter of 
Adam Smith is distant. 
An obvious question immediately suggests itself. What is the framework in which the 
Invisible Hand conjecture makes sense? As will become apparent, the ‘weak’ definition of a 
free-market economy allows the separation between the Invisible Hand Theorem from the 
Invisible Hand Doctrine, and leads naturally to the evolutionary economics framework. 
5.1.The Invisible Hand Doctrine 
Loosely speaking, we can characterize an economic doctrine as a consensus of rational 
opinions on economic matters that float in the scientific mind. The opinions are defended 
using induction (facts), deduction (logic) and abduction (a mix of the inductive and deductive 
approaches). Metaphors and stories are necessary components of an economic doctrine. 




The merits of a particular economic doctrine rest less on its theoretical foundations than on its 
advantages over the actual performance of rival doctrines. Furthermore, the relative 
importance of competing economic doctrines is historically tested in the sense that history 
decides which doctrine will prevail. Time provides the ultimate test to accept or reject an 
economic doctrine. 
The Invisible Hand Doctrine proclaims that a free-market economy in the sense just defined 
is the best available form of economic organization. There can be little doubt that this 
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doctrine is a truly remarkable insight. It is the dominant view in which today’s economists 
think and communicate.  
Quite obviously, the stunning success of the Invisible Hand Doctrine is based on historical 
evidence, not on the Invisible Hand Theorem. For example, when Nikita Khrushchev visited 
the United States in 1959 and promised that the Soviet Union would soon bury the United 
States –by outproducing it– the Russian leader was (subliminally) predicting that the 
Communist Doctrine would historically prevail over the Invisible Hand Doctrine. History has 
shown that societies which rely on the Invisible Hand Doctrine achieved their economic aims 
more successful than others. Economies cannot, so far as we know, be planned by a ‘central 
intelligence.’  
It would hardly be necessary to stress that the appropriate interpretation of the Invisible Hand 
paragraph is inextricably linked to the Invisible Hand Doctrine. Failure to separate the 
Invisible Hand Doctrine from the Invisible Hand Theorem distorts thinking about the 
Invisible Hand conjecture, creating the misconception that business innovation is overlooked 
by the Invisible Hand passage. 
The Invisible Hand Doctrine is the most famous guideline in all of economics: the road to 
economic prosperity starts with a free-market economy. An economy revolving around 
economic freedom and private ownership of resources typically displays three attributes. 
First, free-markets generate prices able to coordinate the millions of firms and consumers that 
make up the economy. Second, free-markets engender a continuous flow of innovations that 
add to economic prosperity. And finally, this sort of economy tends to produce satisfactory 
social outcomes. It is no exaggeration to say that the doctrine survives only because there is 
nothing better we know about. 
5.2.Evolutionary Economics 
It should be clear that the Invisible Hand conjecture is an insight that supports a doctrine. But 
we still need a satisfying conceptual structure in which the conjecture can be embedded in a 
meaningful way. We believe that an appropriate interpretative framework for the Invisible 
Hand conjecture can be found in the evolutionary approach. To be more precise, the Invisible 
Hand fits nicely with the convergence of scholarly strands associated with Joseph Alois 
Schumpeter, Friedrich August von Hayek, Israel M. Kirzner, Frank H. Knight, George L. S. 
Shackle, and Brian J. Loasby, to name some of the most prominent contributors.  
It is impossible to summarize in a few paragraphs the enduring contributions of these prolific 
authors. But it is true, also, that all scholars of innovation are familiar with their work. We 
feel that the following succinct outline –admittedly incomplete– is an acceptable background 
vision for interpreting the central message conveyed by the Invisible Hand. 
We start the outline with a summary formulation of the ‘connecting principles.’ The line of 
reasoning Schumpeter (1934)-Hayek (1978)-Kirzner (1973) can be thought of as a 
conceptualization of a creative economy, that is, an economy in which the increase in the 
standard of living of its residents is primarily based on the production of profitable new ideas. 
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The incessant search for novelty is the manifestation of a creative economy at work. This 
leads us to Knight (1921) and Shackle (1972): uncertainty is the precondition for imagination, 
and imagination is the source of creativity. Loasby (2002) articulates what may be called 
evolutionary economics synthesis. This synthesis presupposes a creative economy and is the 
natural environment in which the Invisible Hand works its magic. 
To bring out clearly the progression of thought through time, a very brief review of the 
individual contributions is in order. 
(1) Schumpeter  
Schumpeter (1934) was the first economist to maintain that it is impossible to understand the 
economy without a thorough understanding of business innovation and to emphasize the 
crucial role of growth-inducing profit-seeking innovators. Schumpeter (1954, p. 182) was 
also the first economist to surmise that the original contribution of Adam Smith is to be found 
in the set of Essays on Philosophical Subjects, and especially his History of Astronomy –not 
in the Wealth of Nations.
vii
 
(2) Hayek  
In a conference delivered to a meeting of the Philadelphia Society at Chicago in 1968, 
Friedrich Hayek considered an economy in which competition is a discovery process. The 
economic agents in this economy are constantly striving to expand their knowledge into some 
area where knowledge is scarce or non-existent in order to find out whether they might 
develop new products or processes or new forms of organization. In the view of Hayek 
(1978), innovations are launched first, the benefits and costs are discovered afterward.  
(3) Kirzner  
Kirzner’s (1973) entrepreneurs are alert economic agents seeking unexploited opportunities. 
Kirzner fundamental proposition is that the greater the range of unexploited opportunities, the 
greater the chance that someone will discover them, and the greater the incentive to search for 
new ideas with economic value. 
(4) Knight 
Innovativeness raises uncertainties and ambiguities. It was Frank Knight (1921) who first 
stressed the importance of separating risk (or calculable uncertainty) from uncertainty in the 
strict sense (or Knightian uncertainty). Risk poses no threat to perfect competition but the 
homogeneity of perfect competition cannot be preserved under Knightian uncertainty. 
Economic success is in part a reflection of entrepreneurial capabilities. Knight did not believe 
that economic success was purely a matter of chance. Innovativeness poses ambiguity and the 
law of ‘unanticipated consequences’ applies. Merton (1936). 
(5) Shackle  
This is not the occasion for an evaluation of the George Shackle’s (1972) contributions to 
economics; but it is relevant to note that he considered with care and lucidity two important 
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insights for evolutionary economics. First, prices have an allocative role and a practical role 
as conventions which simplify decisions (Shackle 1972, 227-228). Second, uncertainty can be 
exploited and endured, and above all, uncertainty is the mother of imagination (Shackle 1972, 
444). 
(6) Loasby 
The evolutionary economics synthesis is due to Loasby (2002). His synthesis presupposes a 
creative economy in a fundamental way. The economy is populated by indefatigable seekers 
of novelty who are elements in a vast and complex system plagued by uncertainty. The 
perpetual search for successful innovations incites the growth of knowledge.  
More specifically, Loasby’s (2002) paper is a tour de force involving three stages. The first 
stage consists of the formulation of a broad definition of the term evolution: “evolution is 
broadly defined as a process, or cluster of processes, which combines the generation of 
novelty and the selective retention of some of the novelties generated.” (Loasby 2002, 1227). 
This definition suffices to attain two objectives: first, drawing the line between evolutionary 
and non-evolutionary economics, and second, establishing the differences between 
evolutionary economics and the biological model. 
Then, Loasby convincingly argues that Adam Smith’s economics provides a better basis for 
evolutionary economics than biological models, and identifies seven elements in Smith’s 
psychological theory: innovation (new ideas); complex motivation; link between emotion and 
aesthetic; diffusion of connecting principles; renewed search for connecting principles; the 




In the final stage, Loasby invokes the unifying principle of evolutionary economics, namely: 
the behaviour of any system depends on both the elements of which it is composed and the 
pattern of interactions between them, and remind us that understanding business innovation 
requires understanding of human knowledge. The construction of knowledge consists of 
creating categories and establishing links between them, that is, “human intelligence relies on 
connecting principles.” (Loasby 2002, 1235). 
5.3.The Ultimate Message 
Reverting to the purpose of our paper –reconciling the Invisible Hand and innovation– we 
proffer that the ultimate message of Adam Smith’s immortal metaphor has to be read within 
the evolutionary economics synthesis. Smith proclaimed that the economic process works 
exceedingly well in the context of free-markets and well-defined property rights. The free-
markets envisaged by Adam Smith are populated by self-interested profit-seeking individuals 
and involve both an allocative function and a process of discovery. These individuals 
decipher the signals sent by either the prices of existing products or the potential profits 
associated with products not yet introduced in the market. There are purposeful interactions 
and unintended consequences resulting from these interactions. The signals are the unseen 
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forces (or Invisible Hand) that govern the evolution of a creative economy and stimulate the 
growth of knowledge.  
Homo economicus is not the only economic agent alluded in the Invisible Hand paragraph. 
Homo creativus –defined as someone who is ingenious in introducing novelty that adds to his 
own wealth, prestige, and power– is also touched by the unseen forces of the free-market. He 
is a decision maker unable to optimize because uncertainty pervades the innovation process. 
His job is to create new ideas and to put them into effect. 
6. Summary  
Returning to the opening paragraph of this paper, it should be emphasized that no complete 
understanding of the economy is possible without a thorough grounding in the world of 
business innovation. As a result, the neoclassical orthodoxy deeply rooted in the teaching of 
economics should be complemented with an integration of innovation in elementary 
economic education.
ix
 Fortunately, this integration fits nicely with the Invisible Hand 
conjecture. 
Adam Smith proposed that the free-market mechanism acted like a guiding Invisible Hand. 
The felicitous metaphor he chose was exactly apposite to describe the impersonal workings 
of that human institution, the free-market economy. Free markets typically work well to 
expand income and wealth as well as economic opportunities. 
The idea that perfect competition achieves both Pareto efficiency and some form of welfare 
maximization –often captured by the expression Invisible Hand Theorem– pervades much of 
the history of economic thought. This theorem exhibits two severe limitations: first, the 
theorem refers to a non-existent economy, and second, innovation is assumed away. 
Certainly, Adam Smith did not suggest as much with the assertion that in pursuing her own 
gain, the individual is led by an Invisible Hand to promote an end that she does not intend 
and is frequently in the interest of society. 
However, confusion still prevails. For example, Landreth and Colander assert that Arrow and 
Debreu proved the Invisible Hand conjecture:  
General equilibrium theorists have found the answer to the question  
“Does the invisible hand work?” to be yes, as long as certain conditions  
hold true. Their proof, for which Arrow and Debreu received Nobel  
prizes, was a milestone in economics because it answered the  
conjecture Adam Smith has made to begin the classical tradition in  
economics. Much subsequent work has been done in general  
equilibrium theory to articulate the invisible-hand theorem more  
elegantly and to modify its assumptions, but by first proving it, Arrow  
and Debreu earned a place in the history of economic thought. 
(Landreth and Colander 2002, 393, italics added) 
Undoubtedly, the proof of existence of general equilibrium constitutes a major achievement 
for the formalist revolution in microeconomics that started in the late 1930s. It is true that the 
17 
 
Arrow-Debreu proof of the existence and optimality of general equilibrium is mathematically 
impeccable but it is true, also, that the Arrow-Debreu model does not prove or disprove the 
Invisible Hand conjecture. The Arrow-Debreu model is both a supreme and extreme example 
of a purely deductive model. 
The Arrow-Debreu proposition that “a free-market economy throws up efficiency” engenders 
two paradoxes. First, no real economy satisfies the necessary conditions for the Invisible 
Hand Theorem and it is impossible to empirically refute the Invisible Hand Theorem. 
Second, the Invisible Hand of the free-market economy cannot perform any task in relation to 
business innovation.  This is nonsense as descriptive economics. 
The famous Invisible Hand paragraph in the Wealth of Nations is silent on the question of 
efficient allocation of resources and Smith had little to say on the subject anywhere else in the 
Wealth of Nations. In this paper we have disentangled what we believe is the appropriate 
interpretation of the Invisible Hand conjecture from what we believe is the distorted view 
emerging from the Invisible Hand Theorem.  
The reconciliation of the Invisible hand and innovation has been accomplished in two steps. 
First, we have shown that the conjecture supports the Invisible Hand Doctrine. Somewhat 
loosely, this doctrine asserts that the road to economic prosperity starts with the organization 
of the economy along the lines of the weak definition of a free-market economy (a far cry 
from perfect competition). Second, we make contact with evolutionary economics to find an 
approach able to accommodate the Invisible Hand Doctrine. 
Loasby (2002) has argued convincingly that Adam Smith provides a foundational model of 
the growth of knowledge as an evolutionary process and has articulated an evolutionary 
economics synthesis by connecting the lines of argument associated with Schumpeter, Hayek, 
Kirzner, Knight, and Shackle. If we want to do economics in the spirit of these outstanding 
pioneers, we must switch from close to open systems, and from logical inference to reliable 
inference.  
 
The evolutionary synthesis is the appropriate framework for the comprehension of the 
fundamental message of the Invisible Hand paragraph. A creative economy lies at the heart of 
this synthesis. Smith is saying that the participants in a free-market economy are profit-
seeking creatures motivated by self-interest and that the Invisible Hand of the free-markets 
guides this self-interest into promoting general economic well-being. Both homo economicus 
and homo creativus are tacitly contemplated in the paragraph in question. Both of them are 
profit-oriented individuals. However, homo economicus does not innovate and never will. 
Homo creativus is the key agent behind the growth of knowledge. 
Economists know well that to interpret the great economic thinkers of past times is not an 
easy task. However, the succeeding generations of economists –Nobel Prize winners 
included– who are ‘standing on the shoulders of the giants,’ should make sure that their 
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 In particular, the familiar comparative statics analysis completely ignores the creative response. A glance at 




 In the golden edition of Economics, Samuelson uses the expression “invisible hand result” instead of “invisible 
hand theorem.” (Samuelson and Nordhaus 1998,  285). 
 
iii
 Technological externalities arise when economic activities bestow benefits (or impose costs) that are not paid 
for in the marketplace. If costless negotiation is possible between the parties concerned, externalities do not 
prevent efficiency. Externalities –both positive and negative– are an important and pervasive phenomenon in the 
contemporaneous economy. 
iv
 Assuming away innovation has another ‘desirable’ implication on efficiency grounds. Innovation nearly 
always engenders technological externalities such as knowledge spillovers. But for a free-market economy to be 
efficient, there must be no technological external effects.  
v




 This point is forcibly made by D. McCloskey (1983). 
 
vii
 In the History of Astronomy, Smith (1980) introduced a psychological theory of the emergence and 
development of science as a consequence of a human desire for mental tranquillity. Philosophers and scientists 
create categories of analysis and formulate links between them through ‘connecting principles.’ (Smith 1980, 
45). 
viii
 The explanation of the Smith’s theory appears in the sub-section entitled ‘The Evolution of Ideas and 
Capabilities’ (Loasby 2002, 1231 -1233). In passing, we note that this sub-section can be thought of as a proof 
that Schumpeter was right in relation to the original contribution of Adam Smith. 
ix
 This possibility is explored in Pol (2013). 
